Between Philosophy and Art

Jonathan Gilmore
Between Philosophy and Art

“Every theory of painting is ametaphysics,” declares Merleau-Ponty
in “Eye and Mind,” his last major philosophical essay on the visual
arts (OE42/171/132)

a concepção de como o self, corpo, mente e mundo inter-relacionam
a arte ocupa um lugar central para elaboração de sua fenomenologia


Does the essay offer an analysis of C´ezanne, of C´ezanne’s painting,
of painters and paintings, or of artists and art in general of which
C´ezanne and his work are – in relevant ways – representative? If
philosophy requires general applicability, does this mean that as
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion is more particularly focused, it is less
philosophical?

um foco estreito para um amplo

 I argue, more specifically, that this tension
in Merleau-Ponty’s essays between the attempt, on one hand,
to offer a general philosophical theory and, on the other, to furnish
particular explanations and interpretations of art, is ultimately left
unresolved. That is, his deep commentaries on the arts illustrate and
extend his general philosophical views but generate no philosophy
of art in them selves.

em A dúvida de Cézanne
começa com um catálogo de algumas dúvidas epistemológicas do pintor (só mais tarde será a sua existencial e metafísicadúvidas a ser explorada): ele trabalha sozinho, sem a confirmaçãode estudantes ou o incentivo de críticos; ele se pergunta seele tem talento suficiente; ele suspeita que seu estilo incomum pode serdevido a um defeito em sua visão. Merleau-Ponty descarta a últimaexplicação fisiológica, mas flerta atribuindo alguns explicações para os diversos valores temperamental, físico e males psicológicosa partir do qual o pintor sofreu - a sua "constituição mórbida", possível"Esquizofrenia", "alienação da humanidade", "fraqueza nos nervos",e assim por diante - só para descartar a ideia de que o significado do
 trabalho do artista pode ser determinada a partir de tais características de sua vida.

mas é válido para todos
 a arte, o artista e a vida do artista são interdependentes 
a arte reflete a vida do criador
mas não de modo transparente

Cézanne instantiates the kind of perception
that phenomenology ascribes to all ordinary perception. Yet Cézanne
makes thematic the content of that phenomenological description of
what he sees, raising it to a level of perspicuity such that his painting
is both the product of vision and about vision, both exemplifies
the way in which we perceive our environment and pictorially describes
or reflects on the way in which we perceive. At the same
time, Cézanne faces the problem of such phenomenological description:
the phenomenologist describes the prereflective and prejudgmental
bases for our experience in the world, but in describing that
experience freezes it, or corrupts it, turning it into what the partial
(and thus falsely totalizing) account of perceptual experience offered
by science would say it is. In this way, C´ezanne’s painting is both
an object for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis and, like
self-psychoanalysis, the source of a phenomenological analysis in
itself.

critica o impressionismo, afetação, materialismo, ali há pensamento
Cézanne tardio, estilo próprio, que Merleau-POnty chamou de desumano

aparência domundo, mas a aparência do mundo, uma vez que vem a ser configurado comoespaço de formas individualizadas para um observador.
em vez de mostrar as sensações
 Cézanne tried to render the
process by which such sensations feed into the generation of the landscape
or other objects of experience.
volta à presença do objeto

Merleau-Ponty também contesta teorias positivistas de percepçãosegundo a qual o mundo aparece-nos como dados dos sentidos
que são interpretados e dados por configurações mentais.
ele argumenta que a perspectiva particular de consciência de alguémnão deve ser entendido apenas como uma tela de subjetividade que, seretirá-la, iria permitir o acesso ao próprio objeto.  

 “Perspective does not appear to
me to be a subjective deformation of things but, on the contrary, to
be one of their properties, perhaps their essential property. It is precisely
because of it that the perceived possesses in itself a hidden and
inexhaustible richness, that is a ‘thing’” (SC 201/186)

 just as phenomenology rejected the dichotomy
between realism and idealism, so Cézanne is described by Merleau-
Ponty as refusing to be fixed between the poles of impressionism
and symbolism, between a notion of art as rendering only appearances
and a notion of art as grounded in an artist’s personal, perhaps
idiosyncratic response to the world.

Cézanne demonstra a relação com o mundo como seres encarnados
com uma perspectiva
e com incompleta compreensão do mundo em que o significado que
experimentamos surge em nosso corpo em nosso confronto com o mundo
e não em categorias dadas na mente

objetos tem significado primeiro por causa de nossa relação sensoriomotora com eles

Phenomenological description expresses
the meaning objects have as a consequence of belonging to the orbit
of such embodied beings: “the experience of a real thing cannot be
explained by the action of that thing on my mind: the only way for a
thing to act on a mind is to offer it a meaning, to manifest itself to it,
to constitute itself vis-à-vis the mind in its intelligible articulations”(SC 215/199).

Cézanne para MP recusa-se a forma habitual de ver o mundo
mas o que a pintura dele nos mostra que nós não vemos no mundo?
não é aquele mundo dos homens...mas o mundo mesmo...interpretação minha...

One response, suggested but not explicitly
argued for by Merleau-Ponty, is that C´ezanne’s techniques constitute
discoveries by which he is able to make salient or perspicuous
something that is part of visual experience, but not recreate that visual
experience. Thus, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between a landscape
painting by C´ezanne in which he shows “nature pure” and a
photograph of the same scene that would invariably suggest “man’s
works, conveniences, and imminent presence” (SNS 18/14; AR 64).

If the mechanical reproduction displays such an already categorized
and inhabited world, this would not be because the photographer intends
it to be so but because the photographer in Merleau-Ponty’s
comparison lacks the technical means to show the world in any way
except as we habitually see it. If C´ezanne’s painting prevents that
experience of seeing an image just as one sees the world, it is not
because his depiction of the landscape leaves features out that the
photograph leaves in. It is because the painter, unlike the photographer,
employs a technique that calls attention to – and does not just
participate in – the ways in which objects are given individuation,
meaning and form. So, in Merleau-Ponty’s reference to what ´Emile
Bernard described as “C´ezanne’s suicide – aiming for reality while
denying himself the means to attain it,” it is not just any painterly
techniques that are denied, but those, such as mathematical perspective,
by which a preformed, familiar, and naturalizing order is
imposed on the flux of experience (SNS 17/12; AR 63).

Cézanne tematiza o uso de sua perspectiva
revela estas de uma forma que permitem ser refletidas como uma convenção

o pintor
“abandoning himself to the chaos of sensations” (SNS 17/13; AR 63).


Here, Merleau-Ponty refers to more than just exclusively visual sensations.
For he argues that sensations are not experienced as arriving
individually, one after the other, but holistically, each conditioning
the others as they are all revealed. Sartre writes in this connection
of how a
lemon is extended throughout its qualities, and each of its qualities is extended
throughout each of the others. It is the sourness of the lemon which
is yellow, it is the yellow of the lemon which is sour . . . if I poke my finger
into a jar of jam, the sticky coldness of that jam is a revelation to my fingers
of its sugary taste.

cita aquela parte de pintar odores, na verdade uma citação de Cézanne
tais sensações holísticas colocam o corpo num papel primordial
na constituição dos objetos
de uma perspectiva vivida

Cézanne não escolhe entre representar as coisas como elas são ou da forma como elas aparecem. Em vez disso, ele deseja:
“depict matter as it takes
on form, the birth of order through spontaneous organization” (SNS
18/13; AR 63–4) 

ao desenhar o objeto sem contorno é como que sugerisse a forma
algo que está na fenomenologia do Hurssel sobre a ausência e presença dos objetos
e Merleau-Ponty também trabalha essa questão, para o qual nossa intencionalidade motora
projeta 

depois no fim do cap. do qual se refere Gilmore, falando de filósofos e pintores
afirmando que os dois estão envolvidos no mesmo tipo de projeto
apesar na diferença de métodos e materiais

The important difference, then, between Cézanne’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s investigations is not the result, but that the painter
may not be aware, or at least not be able to articulate his awareness,
of the truth of experience he has revealed, whereas the philosopher
might be able to articulate the truth of experience he has uncovered.  

devem lidar com o risco de distorcer tbm

. In his
late, unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty
appears to seek to dissolve this contrast between experience and its
linguistic articulation, suggesting that the structures of the two are
interdependent. Here, at least, his treatment serves as a counterinstance
to the charge that a philosophy of art invariably subordinates
art to philosophy or deforms the art in making it amenable to philosophical
analysis. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges in a way that
the artist can engage in a kind of philosophical analysis of experience
that is not entirely open to the philosopher.
The distinction between philosopher and painter is posed once
again in “Eye and Mind” where Merleau-Ponty describes the scientific
point of view that treats objects and beings in the world as
essentially susceptible to manipulation and control.

ah que bom este artigo...

explica por que Merleau-POnty sugere a diferença da arte e filosofia
 by contrast, that the domain of inquiry that belongs to the arts is
precisely this human world that “operationalism” – a way of casting
the world in instrumental terms – ignores. However, whereas literature
(as well as philosophy) must appraise what it treats, must have
a judgmental relation to its subject, the painter is “entitled to look at
everything without being obliged to appraise what he sees.” Merleau-
Ponty says that the painter alone can stand outside the sphere of
action and judgment, “as if in the painter’s calling there were some
urgency above all other claims on him.” Merleau-Ponty asks what
this calling is, “What, then, is the secret science which he has or
which he seeks?” (OE14–15/161/123). Although here he appears to
invoke a modernist notion of artistic autonomy, in which art is in
its essence held to be immune to the demands of the practical,moral,
and political spheres, Merleau-Ponty understands artistic autonomy
not as a rejection of the world’s claims on the artist, but the pursuit
of a claimthat is greater. This claim, which Merleau-Ponty develops
in “Eye and Mind” (in a way that represents a change from his predominant
concern with vision in the earlier essays), addresses the
artist’s role in expressing a way of existing in the world that is not
just his own but is that of the collective group, society, or milieu to
which he belongs. Yet it is precisely in absenting himself, in a form
of autonomous existence, from the demands of action and judgment
that define membership in such a society that the artist is able to
achieve such general, nonindividualistic expression.

o pintor leva o seu corpo com ele, cita Valéry, MP cita
sugerindo a visão encarnada que está em MP
aquele que se encontra com o mundo com seu corpo
e não um ponto de vista
aliás...tem uma citação que fala que o pintor pinta com o corpo, será que a mesma que
o Gilmore tá citando?
acho que é... “takes his body
with him.”

contra onoção de um sujeito unificado que serve como garantia transcendentalsobre a unidade do mundo, 

Merleau-Ponty introduces ways of
speaking of a decentered self: one that is not immediately present to
itself. There is, he writes, “another subject beneath me, for whom
a world exists before I am here, and who marks out my place in it.
This captive or natural spirit is my body” (PP 294/254/296).

 “The body’s animation
is not the assemblage or juxtaposition of its parts.” Rather, it emerges
fromwhat Merleau-Ponty describes as “a kind of crossover” between
the body as subject and the body as object: “between the seer and
the visible, between touching and touched” (OE21/163/125).

nos seus escritos tardios MP vai falar desta relação
da atitude em direção ao mundo
préreflexiva
da aderência préjulgamento do mundo

So, Merleau-Ponty writes,
“painting is an analogue or likeness only according to the body,”
meaning that it is not a visual identity that determines likeness between
image and world but a fit between the understanding of the
world the painter’s image offers and our prereflective, prejudgmental
sense-making experience of what we perceive (OE 24/165/126).

a pintura não é uma cópia do visível
pq é a partir de perspectiva
mas é o mundo que vemos
em relação à nossa percepção

expressa o que exige uma interminável tarefa
como a fenomenologia, sem fim...a experiência não termina
não é realismo, ou naturalismo como MP se refere às pinturas de Cézanne
não é mostrar as simples aparências das coisas
a arte é fundamentalmente um processo de expressão
“a process of expressing” (SNS 23/17;
AR 67–8).
 “‘Conception’
cannot precede ‘execution’” (SNS 24/19; AR 69)

Thus, Merleau-
Ponty refers to Andr´e Marchand’s comment, after Paul Klee, “In a
forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at
the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me. . . . I
think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and not
want to penetrate it” (OE 31/167/129).

But Merleau-Ponty does not advocate a theory of art as idiosyncratically
expressive. He says that an artist such as C´ezanne “speaks
as the first man spoke and paints as if no one had ever painted before,”
so that the risk is whether what is expressed can succeed in
being extracted from the flow of experience and take on a meaning
for the artist and for others (SNS 24/19; AR 69). Expression thus implies
a kind of social context in which meaning can be shared, and
consequently expression admits the possibility of failure ofmeaning
as well. This, then, is the deeper, existential andmetaphysicalmeaning
of C´ezanne’s doubt, a doubt about whether his work can achieve
meaningfulness at all. It is a doubt that springs fromthe contingency
of meaning when the creation of art enjoins no preestablished language
of forms but offers, in both content and form, a new order of
expression. As in the quote referring to Klee, Merleau-Ponty conceives
of such meaning as generated not exclusively by the artist,
but by the world in which the artist is situated. In The Visible and
the Invisible, he describes how in performance the musician “feels
himself, and others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the
sonata sings through him” (VI 199/151). It is as if the artist – like the
rhapsode in Plato’s Ion – serves only as a vehicle for the expression
of the artwork, rather than the reverse.
  
a arte como divulgação do mundo...teve muita coisa interessante antes...pootz 
do caralho, inclusive um comentário sobre a posição de Sartre

 “The painter’s vision is
not a view upon the outside, amerely ‘physical–optical’ relation with
the world. The world no longer stands before him through representation;
rather, it is the painter to whom the things of the world give
birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible”
(OE 69/181/141)

“The painter can do nomore
than construct an image; he must wait for this image to come to life
for other people. When it does, the work of art will have united these
separate lives; it will no longer exist in only of them like a stubborn
dream. . . . It will dwell undivided in several minds” (SNS 26/20; AR
70).

começa a falar de estilo, em Linguagem indireta e as vozes do silêncio, quando MP
afirma que a percepção já é estilizada

 Merleau-Ponty contends that style
should be understood as the expression of an individual’s bodily perception
of the world: style encodes what our embodied existence in
the world makes salient about it, that is, how we, prior to any intellectual
judgment, give meaning and configuration to the world. Yet
just as our experience is perspectival, so, too, a style instantiates a
particular point of view, one that serves to assemble and integrate
features of the world into coherent objects, even as it shows the
impossibility of perceptual closure. So all persons have a stylistic
relation to the world; the artist, however, is the one who reveals that
relation in material forms such as sculpture and painting.

“a way of inhabiting the world, of treating it, and of interpreting it
by her face, by clothing, the agility of the gesture and the inertia
of the body,” 

“the perceived
world . . . is not a pure object of thought . . . it is, rather, like a universal
style shared in by all perceptual beings.”

cita o caso de REnoir que pinta um riacho em frente ao mar de Cassis,

uma vida, um estilo de ser no mundo
“if we experience no external constraints, it is
because we are our whole exterior.”

“if there is true freedom, it can only come about in the course of our
life by our going beyond our original situation and yet not ceasing to
be the same” (SNS 27–8/21; AR 71–2).

It might be objected that to go beyond one’s original situation or
to change one’s fundamental project is, within the confines of the
theory Merleau-Ponty sketches, precisely to change one’s self, to be
a different person and thus realize freedom not within one’s own life,
but within the life of “another.”

MP diz que nós, nunca inteiramente mudamos
 “looking back on what we were, we
can always find hints of what we have become” (SNS 28/21; AR 72)

não há garantia de que os recursos que sobrevivem a uma mudança naauto são características essenciais, em vez de recursos apenas acidentais quepode-se encontrar em ambas as encarnações anteriores e posteriores da pessoa

Assim, o que importa para o bem da unidade é se o indivíduoa partir de sua própria perspectiva pode ver a capacidade ou o desejo de iralém da situação original, tal como previsto nesta situação inicial.


sua vida não é apenas determinada pelos acontecimentos do passado 
não só o futuro é determinado pelo passado
 but the past,
through imaginative projection, is determined by the future
determinação como interpretação
 This is why Merleau-Ponty
can assert that psychoanalysis – as a hermeneutic method – allows
us to see our being free as amounting to the “creative repetition of
ourselves, always, in retrospect, faithful to ourselves” (SNS 32/25;
AR 75). 

“in every life, one’s birth and one’s past define categories or
basic dimensions that do not impose any particular act but which
can be found in all” (SNS 31–2/24–5; AR 75)

Merleau-Ponty appears
to operate with two positions here. One is that a person’s life can be
understood as more and more conditioned by actions and events as
it is lived, such that at any one time the cumulative history of one’s
life shapes its subsequent history, even if it does not exhaustively determine
it. The other position is that one’s life is best conceived not
as a chain of causes and effects but as exhibiting a kind of organic development,
such that the nature of the person is not the result of the
actions and events attending one’s life, but rather emerges through
them. This emergence gives a unity to the life not just from the outside,
as the entity that happens to serve as the locus of those events,
but from the self-interpreting inside as well. The nature of this self
may not be visible in any greater degree to the individual herself
than to external observers. Thus, Merleau-Ponty speaks of Cézanne
as “never at the center of himself,” needing to look to others for selfrecognition
(SNS 32/25; AR 75). Again, the analogy with an artist’s
style presents itself: an artist’s style, once formed, may emerge into
perspicuity only in the course of the artist’s work, becoming visible
to the artist and to others only late in his oeuvre. In “Indirect Language
and the Voices of Silence,” Merleau-Ponty speaks of an artist’s
style as “just as recognizable for others and just as little visible to
him as his silhouette” (S 67/53; AR 90).

não consegue passar sua fenomenologia para outros pintores, como cita
Leonardo
afirma que o pintor deve penetrar no
“envelope of things” (OE 71–2/182/142) 


 But such a phenomenologically
inflected principle of art could hardly be extended over the
whole of art history. Indeed, it might be said that such a model of
art – art as a competitor and an antidote to the scientific view of
the world – applies mainly to those artists (Leonardo, Monet in his
series paintings, C´ezanne, Seurat) who looked to science, in part,
for their own self-definition and who sought to arrive, through their
own means and methods of art, at truths about a world otherwise
understood in scientific terms.(Recall that while Merleau-Ponty attributes
to C´ezanne the endeavor to depict form as it comes into
being, he acknowledges C´ezanne’s own understanding of his project
as committed to the representation of things as they are.) Gilmore

cita a influência da fenomenologia de Merleau-POnty em obras
minimalistas, como Richard Serra, coisas deste tipo
mas a obra que Gilmore cita é Shift

A bit later, Richard Serra would draw on such a minimalist
interpretation of phenomenology to create pieces such as Shift
of 1970–2, a site-specific work composed of six sections of concrete
(815 feet in total) laid down on a hilly field in King City, Ontario.
There the art’s meaning is generated not through its appearance, nor
through its “concept,” but through the way it structures the experience
of individuals – asmoving, seeing bodies – who start at opposite
ends of the work and try to keep each other in view as they traverse
the terrain in which “abstract geometries were constantly submitted
to the redefinition of a sited vision.”

o artista divulgando um ponto de vista sobre o mundo 
Merleau-Ponty appears to believe, however, that such a general
style is grounded in, and expresses, an even more fundamental phenomenon:
a common human style of perceptual comportment. In
this way, he offers a model of art history that is analogous to, but
more radical than, theories of the internal evolution of art developed
by such philosophicallyminded historians of art as Alois Riegl,
Erwin Panofsky, and Henri Focillon. Riegl sought to uncover the
unity within the variousmanifestations of art by appeal to universal
“laws” of artistic development and a Hegelian concept of the Kunstwollen,
a kind of aesthetic will or intention that operates through
the artist. Panofsky tried to register the unity of historical periods in
the idea of a symbolic form, a neo-Kantian notion of period-specific,
a priori categories that structure thought and experience. And Focillon
theorized that the unity of art through its changes was explained
by the way those transformations were internally generated: “form
liberates other forms according to its own laws.”16
 
Merleau-Ponty, however, proposes a kind of unity much more fundamental
than that offered by these theorists, one derived from the
basic orientation of the human body in the world. If those art historians
sought a general explanatorymodel of why art changes, Merleau-
Ponty sought a way of understanding how, through its changes, art is
in its essential features the same. Such a view of art history as inhering
in and generated out of a universal style may offer an answer to
the charge that Merleau-Ponty offers less a general theory of art than
a thesis about a particular historicalmoment or formof art. For if all
art is, in its fundamental motivation, the same, then to speak of one
art is to speak of them all. In any case, if Merleau-Ponty’s writings
on art illuminate the experience of art, and the relations between
artist, spectator, and world, without propounding a theory of art that
would admit of universal application, thatmay be one of the sources
of its depth. The artworks and artists he treats serve less as examples
than as exemplary instances, chosen precisely because of the ways in
which they serve as models of what art strives to be. Merleau-Ponty
does not theorize about artistic practice in a way that detaches it
from ordinary human experience but shows instead ways in which
the two are continuous in their interrogation of the world.






 

 

legal perdi todos os comentários do último artigo do Joseph Rouse...que fazia aqui
ok já passou...
 o título é Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Conception of Science
espero que esteja aqui em mim...


e tava tão interessante...mas, resumindo

Scientific theories can never be complete because
which features of the world require scientific description or
explanation depends on our cognitive and practical concerns. As our
concerns change, our theories must also change (consider what the
growing concern to understand weight relations did for and to chemical
theory in the eighteenth century). There cannot be an ideal scientific
theory any more than there can be an ideal map. There must
always be, Merleau-Ponty claimed, a “surplus of the signified over
the signifying” (PP 447/390/453).

that a world is present to us as a field
of truth and error, demands explanation. Why is it that some of our
exploratory stances and conceptions lead to illusion, and others do
not? What accounts for the difference between truth and error? Only
a realist account of the world, it is said, can explain this without
invoking miracles.16 Merleau-Ponty responded that such a demand
mistakenly places rationality outside of the world, outside of the
experiences in which it is manifest.
To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives blend, perceptions
confirm each other, a meaning emerges. But it should not be set in a
realm apart, transposed into Absolute Spirit or into a world in the realist
sense. . . . [T]he only preexistent Logos is the world itself . . . and no explanatory
hypothesis is clearer than the act whereby we take up this unfinished
world in an effort to complete and conceive it. (PP xv/xix–xx/xxii–xxiii)
Rationality is not a problem to be solved. Science can never be made
secure, if security must be found in the certainty of a given content.
The rationality of science, like all rationality, is contingent. It is to
be continually achieved, rather than secured once and for all. The
“unmotivated upsurge of the world” (PP viii/xiv/xv) is the point at
which both scientific and philosophical reflection begin and which
neither can transcend or explain.∗

De volta
Do leito a mirar Vênus
E ele a mirar-me na Terra
É um bom olhar...

é hora de partir,
ui...hahaha 
continuar aquelas etapas tão prazerosas
um ano cheio de expectativas lindas como sempre
na verdade eu sinto como se tivesse trabalhado nas férias
e parece que vai ser assim até que eu morra
eu acho que eu quero
mas
passar a vida sentada tá me deixando um pouco zangada
ou grande parte...não Sâmara, não é sempre assim...eu tô achando que deve ser

tem aulas, congressos, grupos...pessoas....
eu vou ter de sair pra correr todos os dias, para o projeto ser possível..........
corpo aderência
como apresentar-me ao outro?
eu ainda não sei...
é como se fosse voltar pra ilha, aquela do terceiro andar
do lado da árvore que tem galhos apontados pro céu e me faz companhia
e agora estão mais verdes que antes...
vou vê-los, a janela e a mesa que olha pra janela..
a minha vitrola...com os mesmos vinis de sempre...
minhas ilusões de percepção pregadas na parede
toda aquela informação sei lá...
meu céu azul e vermelho..
ai, aqueles três barquinhos....pootz...ok vamos ver tudo como está...
ok
tá tudo perfeito,
os livros de férias, se divirtiu?
bom, eu não sei dizer tbm, será que tudo entrou em mim?
será que eu posso nesse ritmo tornar-me uma especialista?
vc já sabe sobre os especialistas, não é mesmo Sâmara?

ok,
vou voltar pra MP e desculpe meu filósofo pica a conotação
é só entre nós...rs
eu posso colocar a culpa na cultura brasileira? na minha vida?
em Freud??? rs
ah...... acho que não se importaria...rsrs
gostei desse negócio de links.........e que culpa?
que amor?
todas estas palavras...
pootz.... pra que vc escreve isto?

The Embryology of the (In)visible

Mark B. N. Hansen

MP............minando distinções do em-si e para-si
receptividade e espontaneidade
atividade e passividade
principalmente o impasse da filosofia que toma como ponto de partida
a distinção consciência e objeto

What was necessary – and what his second turn to science afforded
– was the introduction of a concept of organismor living body
as a unitary phenomenon constituted by the identity of behavior and
development, a unitary phenomenon of which phenomenality and
consciousness would simply be dependent aspects. Hansen

uma nova ontologia da carne
um conceito filosófico de vida

homem ser que percebe
natureza e corpo

“animality and human being are given only together,
in the interior of a totality of being” (N 339/271).

“will emerge from confusion
only by appealing . . . to brute being such as it is unveiled to us by our
perceptual contact with the world” MP< (N 376; RC 137/166)

o homem não é uma conjunção de animalidade e razão

we must “grasp humanity above
all as another manner of being a body” (N 269/208);

há o invisível do visível
o entrelaçamento
não é só o físico e o sensível
o ser é definido somente pela percepção mas participação no mundo
significação, abertura
engajamento
investimento ativo no espaço, meio
emerge com e e para o próprio movimento que realiza
o que pode fazer
uma realidade interna para o organismo
comportamento é um princípio imanente ao próprio organismo
e o corpo é o local, segundo seu ângulo
equilíbrio e desequilíbrio
flutuação autoregulatória
fenômeno em crescimento

mas não é um princípio de ordem, ou essência
em cada momento há um vazio que se seguirá
um vazio a ser preenchido
há um áspero esboço
no que diz respeito a presente situação
não é um ser positvo e sim interrogativo que define a vida

desequilíbrio
incompletude
desejo na ausência
assombrado por corpos estranhos
problema da carne
como poder ser a minha e a do mundo?
aderência
uma dimensão que dá sentido ao seu entorno


With this complementarity, we grasp nothing less than the identity
of behavior and phenomenon, ofmovement and perception, that
lies at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of life: without
behavior to activate the negativity of life as a problem, there would
simply be no phenomenal dimension at all; and without the natural
negativity as a virtual interiority, there would be no possibility
for such activation to occur in the first place. This is, finally, why
Merleau-Ponty can claim a certain privilege for the human that does
not abjure its immanence within nature. It is only in reference to
the human body that we can truly understand the natural negativity
and the interiority of the living, that we can grasp precisely why
life does not comprise a positive power or spiritual force: “we install
ourselves in perceived being/brute being, in the sensible, in the flesh
where there is no longer a distinction between the in-itself and the
for-itself, where perceived being is emphatically within being” (N
272/210).

Automovimento e excesso: O corpo humano

um vazio que não pode ser preenchido...hahaha eu aprendi isso na terapia...ahahha
a presença do futuro no presente
primado absoluto do movimento
a flutuação organizada pelo corpo

We might say, then, that if the living body solves the problem of
the belonging-together of esse and percipere, it is precisely because –
as essentially self-moving – it opens a divergence between itself and
what it sees, a divergence that is filled by the flesh.4 This is why
Merleau-Ponty can assert that there is a correspondence “of my inside
and [the world’s] outside,” just as there is a “correspondence of
its inside and my outside” (VI 179n/136n).

meu corpo resolve o problema...rsrs cadê o preenchimento da carne?rs

ok


ah melhor parar um pouco...

voltando..

há correspondência entre o interior e o que está fora - o mundo
a percepção do corpo como manifestação do mundo e vice-versa
corpo base de uma consciência encarnada
a descrição do corpo próprio
uma intencionalidade originária ancorada na vida perceptual do corpo
e não uma intencionalidade reflexiva do pensamento
a intencionalidade está enraizado no ser-no-mundo
que a correlação entre um ato de pensar (Nóesis) e
 um conteúdo de pensamento (noema)
não compreende nada mais do que uma abstração desta modalidade primária a 
ser realizadopelo corpo.

consciência não como Eu penso, e sim como Eu posso
 intencionalidade corporal
corpo como mediador do mundo
como base originária da consciência
no fim MP dedica-se a compreender o corpo como uma negação da consciência
como uma parte do próprio mundo!
o movimento é a modalidade do corpo pertencer ao mundo
entrelaçamento, chiasm

“I touch myself touching; my body accomplishes a ‘sort of reflection.’
. . . the touched hand becomes the touching hand, and I am
obliged to say that the sense of touch here is diffused into the body –
that the body is a ‘perceiving thing,’ a ‘subject–object’” (MP< S 210/166)

relação de visão e toque - sujeito e objeto o corpo
movimento

o corpo é uma manifestação sensível do mundo

self movement
Umwelt é o corpo e o ambiente
acoplamento estrutural
do ser em seu meio
pertencimento
carne

acoplamento com o mundo: carne
corpo não é objeto da consciência é do mundo...eu que escrevi assim...
não entendi essa relação divergente entre corpo e mundo...

The
Umwelt is therefore not outside the body, and the body is not other
than the Umwelt; rather, as the passage specifies, the two terms
must be understood as divergences with respect to one another: the
Umwelt (i.e., that part of the environment selected by the body) is
what makes the body self-dimensionalizing, a universal measurant,
and the body is what makes the Umwelt transspatial, not an empirical
“there,” but an absolute “here.” The coupling with an Umwelt
is, then, precisely what clarifies the profound correlation of the body
and the world, the belonging of one to the other that Merleau-Ponty
calls the flesh. (Hansen)


divergência Umwelt-corpo é o inverso da identificaçãoWahrnehmen - Sich bewegen
chiasm entre excesso interno e excesso externo
mundo não é a soma de processos externos
nem a um interior que não está no mundo
Umwelt - plano de vida
acho que vai cair no body schema de novo...
 .....
comportamento
regulação
elemento transtemporal e transespacial
potencialidade no tecido dos elementos físicos
transformando potencialidade em história natural!

Only the analysis of the human body in its specificity will allow us
to ground the phenomenality–transcendence divergence in the fundamental
chiasm of the living, the chiasm between internal equipotentiality
and external disequilibrium. As a “metamorphosis of life,”
our body emerges as a “body of the mind” (following the felicitous
expression of Paul Val ´ery) (N 380; RC 177/196); it is what places our
life as natural history (as the confluence of morphogenesis and selfmovement)
“before us” and whatmakes it “enveloping in relation to
our ‘thought.’” In this sense, the body holds a certain priority in the
operation of phenomenalization–transcendence constitutive of the
flesh. Specifically, it is that in virtue of which there is an other, hidden
side of things, of the body, of the visible – what Merleau-Ponty so
aptly describes as a “being for the living,” a being that exists insofar
as the living “has an Umwelt.” Precisely because it is a being for the
living, the invisible is “not constituted by our thought, but lived as
a variant of our corporeity, i.e., as an appearance of behaviors within
the field of our behavior” (N 338/271). Such being-lived as a variant
of our corporeity is precisely what defines the opening to the visible –
that is, phenomenality itself – not as the being of a perceived (percipi)
but as the activity of perceiving (percipere) defined through its
participation in the activity of being as living (active esse). (Hansen)


chiasm
imanência x transcendência
fenomenalidade X corpo vivo

Merleau-Ponty’s final work articulates
a philosophy of immanence in which the body’s self-transcendence
simply is its mode of belonging to the world. (Hansen)

excesso de potencial do corpo em relação à sua realidade
(excess of the body over itself) and, on the other, an excess of
the body in relation to being as cosmology (excess of being over the
body).

correlação de phenomenalization and transcendence
potencialização movendo-se para fora, para o mundo
fenomenologia da vida sobre a forma do corpo humano
 life is the “establishment of a level around
which divergences distribute themselves.”

sistema de oposições que delimita a vivência
padrão de negações
que faz isto ser ou não o caso
um constitutivo mundo dos vivos
não que se abram pra tudo
mas uma abertura específica
phenomena-enveloped

fenomenologia da vida, ou seja da imanência
o organismo como base dos fenômenos
living body’s
self-transcendence simply is its belonging to the world.
o corpo humano como expressão do ser
the being of life as phenomenon
and the being of the cosmos itself.

eu não entendo esse treco de vida como negatividade, alguém explica?

Cumbre
 

Firme, bajo mi pie, cierta y segura,
de piedra y música te tengo;
no como entonces, cuando a cada instante
te levantabas de mi sueño. 

Ahora puedo tocar tus lomas tiernas,
el verde fresco de tus aguas.
Ahora estamos, de nuevo, frente a frente
como dos viejos camaradas. 

Nueva canción con nuevos instrumentos.
Cantas, me duermes y me acunas.
Haces eternidad de mi pasado.
Y luego el tiempo se desnuda. 

¡Cantarte, abrir la cárcel donde espera
tanta pasión acumulada!
Y ver perderse nuestra antigua imagen
arrebatada por el agua. 

Firme, bajo mi pie, cierta y segura,
de piedra y música te tengo.
Señor, Señor, Señor: todo lo mismo.
Pero, ¿qué has hecho de mi tiempo?

De "Tierra sin nosotros" 1947

(José Hierro)







fenomenologia e ciência
ainda Hansen..
significado fenomenológico e fatos biológicos
tá comentando sobre o Dennett tô entendendo nada
postura intencional a chave para desvendar os mistérios da mente
abandona a metafísica
agnosticismo
função da intencionalidade como estratégia dos vivos
o que ele está falando???????????
ah...a postura intencional como evolução
linguagem, pensamento
antropomorfismo da intencionalidade
a perspectiva que nossas mentes tem que compartilhar...
que foda...
ah o processo evolutivo natural para a postura intencional...
o que sua lógica está dizendo?



eu não tenho mais espaçooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
tenho sim..

ok
dois tipos de intencionalidade
uma biológica sei lá
Here, in short, Dennett leans heavily on the metaphysics
of evolutionary emergence – and on the continuity of being
it assumes – regardless of what his rhetoricmight suggest. At best, he
is guilty of conflating two distinct concepts of intentionality: on one
hand, as a property of the living; on the other, as a descriptive device
for understanding the living (which also happens to be a property of
certain kinds of living beings). Yet, far from invalidating Dennett’s effort to embrace an evolutionary
perspective, this contradiction merely serves to foreground
the need for an ontologically serious account of evolutionary emergence. (Hansen)

Varela agora
eus
rede de egos
neste caso ontológica, diferente de Dennett
organização autopoiética
????????

One significant consequence of this approach is its vastly different
account of intentionality: for Varela, intentionality is a feature of the
basic cognitive level of selfhood and not something reserved for the
humanmind or some other higher-level emergence. (Hansen)


desejo
eu cognitivo
dupla dialética entre ambiente e organismo
que não é tão diferentede acoplamento de auto-movimento e transcendência de Merleau-Ponty.

For Varela as for Merleau-Ponty, it is the self-movement of
the organism that transforms its internal incompleteness (its status
as originary desire or equipotentiality) into the motor of its selfperpetuation,
and it is also self-movement that opens the organism
to the excess of the environment where it discovers nothing less than
the potentiality on which its continuance depends.  Hansen

mas esse eu cognitivo de Varela não tem nada a ver com Merleau-Ponty

This is why, in the end, Varela’s approach can only afford a thirdperson
(observational) account of the necessarily first-person (operational)
perspective of the living being, even when the being in question
is the human being – that form of being equipped, biologically,
with themeans (language) to autonomize itself in relation to its basic
cognitive self. His approach develops an epistemology of the living:
an account of the identity and coupling necessary for a given organismtomaintain
itself as living.We arrive at a phenomenology of the
living only when, with Merleau-Ponty, we recognize the philosophical
implications of this epistemology – the way that, for a quintessentially
first-person being like the human, the coupling of body–mind
and world–environment necessarily implicates phenomenology in
being and being in phenomenology. (Hansen)


its over, bye Mark, see you...haha

Learned a lesson

o copo caiu e não quebrou
quicou e está de pé
caiu do criado mudo.
good.
faltam só umas poucas páginas eram mils, por que está contando?
lembrei do Auto-didata do "A Náusea" era um dicionário?

e o mundo
gira.
Aquelas nuvens passaram muito rápido pela manhã
as estrelas pareciam paradas durante a noite
fixas
sob a minha cabeça
estranho
um estranho lindo
ah nem era tão lindo assim...
de volta a Minha Pica
segundo alguém importante de Cambridge.
eu não tenho medo agora
mas passar a vida sentada a ler
ok learned a lesson
a enrugar a testa,
inclusive descobri que há um verbo em alemão
só pra isso... deve ser Frantztest..haha não...
die Stirn runzeln
ah quem sabe um dia saber pra poder
escrever quem sabe...
ah para Sâmara, não, não para!
até vidros podem cair e não quebrar
pode ser o modo da queda
pode ser o modo de lançar
nossa tá me vindo o cheiro, meu Deus pra que meu corpo lembra disto?
essas lembranças de cheiro são incríveis
como copos que se lançam sem titubear ou surpreender-se
aos estilhaços
nas quedas de criados-mudos
permanecem vidro inteiro sem cortar.

pra quê falar disso?
um fenômeno
um relance
ah tá por acaso é uma metáfora?
eu vou saber...
chega de nem sei o quê...

alimento para mi alma
el mundo todo num instante
por debajo de estrellas
a ver me segura en unos braços
en alguno abrazo
por cierto el gozo es cierto
si es una cosa cierta
medo de las nubes que pasan
mui rápido por las mañanas
eu tenho medo

A Phenomenology of Life

Renaud Barbaras


ich..já começou com citação de Derrida, vou tomar um café...
sobre fenomenologia transcendental e psicológica...pootz...

But the strange unity of these two parallels, that which refers the one to the
other, does not allow itself to be sundered (partager) by them and, by dividing
itself, finally joins the transcendental to its other; this unity is life. One
finds quickly enough that the sole nucleus of the concept of psuchˆe is life as
self-relationship, whether or not it takes place in the formof consciousness.
“Living” is thus the name of that which precedes the reduction and finally
escapes all the divisions which the latter gives rise to. (Derrida)

três páginas e eu não sei do que ele está falando...
algo como a importância da redução fenomenológica, imagino
ok, fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty é a fenomenologia da vida
e completa a de Husserl

I would like to show, then, that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
is really a phenomenology of life, which means Merleau-Ponty’s
thought completes the project of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed,
we can say that Merleau-Ponty’s main purpose, from beginning to
end, is to give sense to the Husserlian lifeworld as it is described
in the Crisis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s purpose is to develop a phenomenology
that takes into account the irreducibility of the lifeworld.
In a note in Phenomenology of Perception, he writes,

Husserl in his last period concedes that all reflection should in the first place
return to the description of the lifeworld (monde v´ecu) (Lebenswelt). But he
adds that, by means of a second “reduction,” the structures of the lifeworld
must be reinstated in the transcendental flow of a universal constitution in
which all the world’s obscurities are elucidated. It is clear, however, that we
are faced with a dilemma: either the constitution makes the world transparent,
in which case it is not obvious why reflection needs to pass through the
lifeworld, or else it retains something of that world and never rids it of its
opacity. (PP 419n/365n/425n)

Merleau-POnty reconhece a especificidade do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt) confronta
o papel da subjetividade transcendental
não se interessa por um mundo de teses (Weltthesis)
um mundo representado...mas o próprio mundo na transparência de sua
constituição

atitude natural X atitude transcendental

The truth is that the relationships between the natural and the transcendental
attitudes are not simple, are not side by side or sequential, like the false
or the apparent and the true. There is a preparation for phenomenology in
the natural attitude. It is the natural attitude which, by reiterating its own
procedures, seesaws (bascule) in phenomenology. It is the natural attitude
itself which goes beyond itself in phenomenology – and so it does not go
beyond itself. (MP, S207/164)

The subject of the lifeworld is precisely life. (Barbaras) adorei!

Leben verbo intransitivo no alemão, no francês tbm
ambígua
viver : estar vivo
experienciando

Comenta um pouco o capítulo sobre sexualidade que está na Fenomenologia da Percepção,
eu gostei muito deste capítulo também, inclusive por falar de Freud...
a sexualidade é tão importante, é corpo,  mas colocá-la acima de todos os fenômenos..???
lembro de apontar a teoria de Freud como uma tautologia...não sei explicar...

ok, voltando ao Barbaras... cito..

Here Merleau-Ponty recognizes that if corporeal life transcends itself
in an existential significance that goes beyond natural needs, it is also true that this significance, whatever it may be, is rooted in
corporeal life. In other words, it is life itself that transcends its natural
or biological dimension and involves the whole realm of meaning:
thus, just as we need a sexual body to develop meaningful relationships
with others, so, too, we must be alive and have sense organs to
experience anything and, finally, to perceive a world.

Depois disso começar a afirmar que a fenomenologia de Merleau-POnty
é fenomenologia da vida...

At the beginning of The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty defines
his subject in the following way: “Our goal is to understand
the relations of consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or
even social. By nature we understand here a multiplicity of events
external to each other and bound together by relations of causality”
(MP, SC 1/3).

Diz que MP propõe um novo significado para o ser..
que não é consciência pura
nem um mero objeto
diz de comportamento

“because, taken in itself, it is neutral with respect
to the classical distinctions between the ‘mental’ and the ‘physiological’
and thus can give us the opportunity of defining them anew”
(MP, SC 2/4).

By taking the concept of behavior as his starting point,
Merleau-Ponty makes possible an investigation concerning life because
behavior is a more neutral and comprehensive notion referring
to what all living beings have in common. (Barbaras)

ao adotar o conceito de comportamento  MP não está livre do  dualismo
realismo e idealismo
há behavioristas que reduzem o comportamento a relações causais
e outros que acreditam ter como fonte a consciência....

o que importa é a metodologia de MP
a descrição do comportamento
a abordagem fenomenológica!!

comportamento não pode ser  reduzido a uma ação mecânica
há intencionalidade
e não depende de uma consciência


vitalismo é uma expressão de impotência
projetamos nos outros organismos nossa percepção
um organismo não é a soma de suas partes
são fenômenos

The problem is this: the phenomenon is not an appearance, but
rather what is given by being itself. Being exists only as phenomenon,
which is to say, phenomenality is reality. On the other hand, the appearing,
the relation of manifestation, clearly entails a distinction
between what is manifest and the manifestation itself. Even if phenomenality
is autonomous, in the sense that it does not depend on
another reality, it cannot be, qua phenomenality, a new reality. It is
the manifestation of something, a “coming to light,” and this entails
a distinction. (Barbaras)

a realidade não é alcançada através de uma abordagem analítica
então a totalidade será de uma só vez fenomenal ereal.

Moreover, thanks to this rigorous analysis of life, Merleau-Ponty
discovers a new meaning of being, situated beyond the distinction
between the in-itself and the for-itself, thus overcoming the opposition
between consciousness and object, which Merleau-Ponty knows he must abandon. (Barbaras)

carne para cadeira
a realidade é outra coisa que sua aparência
existe em si mesma e não depende da consciência
a realidade é fenomenal não porque se refere à consciência
ele se refere à consciência
porque é em si mesmo fenomenal: a consciência é uma dimensão
ou como conseqüência da fenomenalidade, não uma condição para si
"a carne do mundo é do-ser visto, ou seja, é um Serque é eminentemente percipi, e é por isso que podemos entender opercipere "(VI 304/250)

O fenômeno - ou seja, a carne - égrávida de todas as percepções possíveis

ser e não ser
ausência e presença
visível e invisível
aparência e transcendência

The sensible is precisely that medium in which there can be being without
it having to be posited; the sensible appearance of the sensible, the silent
persuasion of the sensible is Being’s unique way of manifesting itself without
becoming positivity, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent. (MP< VI
267/214)    

o todo não é nada mais que suas partes..
a distinção entre essência e existência é uma abstração
o tecido da realidade revela uma comunicação transversal

 As Merleau-Ponty writes, “In a sense, there
is only the multiple, and this totality that surges from it is not a
totality in potential, but the establishment of a certain dimension”
(N 208/156). We know that the aim of the chapter in The Visible
and the Invisible titled “Interrogation and Intuition” is precisely to
surmount this opposition and to disclose a deeper aspect, which he
calls “wild essence,” “dimension,” and “hinge.” I believe, then, that
this notion of dimension, understood as a system of equivalences,
which is Merleau-Ponty’s concept of being, also derives from his
analysis of life. Vital processes reveal a unity of style par excellence,
that is, a kinship that is not based on any positive principle, such as
an essence. Rather, vital processes reveal a communication among
events beyond the spatiotemporal framework. The central concept of
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology derives from the phenomenology of life. (Barbaras)