Another way to put this to say that our ordinary notion of seeing is a success notion, for it logically requires that wat I see be there to be seen, otherwise, I am not really seeing it. I might have thougth I saw it, but if it wasn't there, I didn't. So too with remembering, folowing, and ignoring: you can't remember something that didn't happen; you can't folow someone who isn't out ahead of you, and you can't ignore something that isn't there. ( Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty, pg 34)
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is an attempt to free perception from this semantic-representational paradigm by insisting on the literal rightness of our naive understanding of intentionality as orientation in and directedness toward the world itself. That naive notion is not just a vaguely suggestive metaphor,but literally right, for intentional states are realized in bodily attitudes situated in a concrete physical and social environment. We do not just "have" grasp, posses or contain- the contents of our perceptual experience. (Carman)
lembrei do yo soy yo y mi circunstânica
essa próxima página diz tipo isso
depois do mundo chamar
nossa intencionalidade ingênua
está atenta a estes chamados (deveria)
e não busca o mundo conceitualizado
é o tal do mundo préobjetivo que ele quer, sugere....
Hurssell também voltar às coisas mesmas
descrever...
ainda ficou pouco..
digo:
Phenomenology is a descriptive, not an explanatory enterprise.
A phenomenology of perception is thus an attempt to describe
perceptual experience from a first-person perspective, from the point
of view of the experience being described. (Carman)
Mas se vai usar conceitos, caralho...rs
eu não entendo....tá...volta
The world is there before any anlysis I could carry out... Perception is not
a science of the world, it is not even an act, a dliberate taking up of a position;
it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them (Merleau-Ponty)
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is not a theory of mental representation, but a
descriptive account of perception as a mode of being in the world, an existencial condition
of the very possibility of representations- imaginative, semantic, or otherwise cognitive-
intervening between ourselves and the world. (Carman)
ahãm....explica isso direito...
ah próximo redução fenomenológica...humm mas diz que vai além....?
The best formulation of the reduction is no doubt the one given by Eugen Fink, Husserl's assitant, when he spoke of "astonishment" in the face of the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the foundation of the world, it steps back to see transcendencies rise up before it, it slackens the intentional threads that attach us to the world in order to make them apparent... it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. ... in order to see the word and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it, and... from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world. The greatest lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction.... If we were absolute spirit, the reduction would be unproblematic. But since on the contrary we are in the world, since even our reflections take place in the temporal flux they are trying to capture... there is no thought that embraces all our thought. (PP viii-ix}xiii-xiv]xv)
sou chamada à familiaridade que vivo
nomear o mundo não é tão simples
sensação X feeling
julgar pode ser muito mais agir instintivamente......
descrever o mundo não é fácil...................são poucas as palavras...
For of course experience is rife with with feeling inwardly interwoven, haunted by the past, focused against a back-ground, and intelligente. What Merleau-Ponty criticizes is not our pretheoretical understanding of what we ordinarily call "sensation" and "judgment", that is, but the technical redeployement of those terms in abstraction from what they are originally called upon to describe. In dismissing the psychological concepts of sensation and judgment, he is arguing that perception cannot be understood either as the passive registration of sense data or as free and spontaneous intellectual activity. (Carman)
The word "sensation," Merleau-Ponty observes, is perfectly at home in ordinary language, and the notion at first "seems immediate and obvious." Once uprooted and transplanted in the domain of psychological theory, however, it turns out, "nothing could in fact be more confused" (Merleau-Ponty, PP 9-3-3)
