o olhar iluminando o objeto

a questão é realmente perspectiva

a perspectiva é a coisa

a manifestação da coisa

Although

naive consciousness never confuses the thing with the manner which it

has of appearing to us, and precisely because it does not make this confusion,

it is the thing itself which naive consciousness thinks it is reaching,

and not some inner double, some subjective reproduction. It does not

imagine that the body or that mental “representations” function as a

screen between itself and reality. The perceived is grasped in an indivisible

manner as “in-itself,” that is, as gifted with an interior which I will

never have finished exploring; and as “for-me,” that is, as given “in person”

through its momentary aspects.

eu não me canso de explorar

o objeto ainda assim não é o que vejo dele

mas é como eu vejo o objeto

eu colo sucessivas aparências

meu corpo é que vê

ou fecha os olhos

meu veículo intencional para com o mundo

para transitar no mundo

realidade fisiológica

The body is present to the soul as external things are present; in neither case is it a question of a

causal relation between the two terms. The unity of the human has not yet

been broken; the body has not been stripped of human predicates; it has

not yet become a machine; and the soul has not yet been defined as existence

for-itself. Naive consciousness does not see in the soul the cause of

the movements of the body, nor does it put the soul in the body as the pilot

in his ship.

corpo instrumento de ação

The subject does not live in a world of states

of consciousness or representations from which he would believe himself

able to act on and know external things by a sort of miracle. He lives in a

universe of experience, in a milieu which is neutral with regard to the substantial

distinctions between the organism, thought, and extension; he

lives in a direct commerce with beings, things, and his own body. The ego

as a center from which his intentions radiate, the body which carries them,

and the beings and things to which they are addressed are not confused:

but they are only three sectors of a unique field. Things are things, that is,

transcendent with respect to all that I know of them and accessible to

other perceiving subjects, but intended precisely as things; as such they

are the indispensable moment of the lived dialectic which embraces them.

The world divides in two. There will be the real world as it is outside my

body and the world as it is for me, numerically distinct from the first; the

external cause of perception and the internal object which it contemplates

will have to be separated. The body proper has become a material

mass and, correlatively, the subject withdraws from it to contemplate its

representations within himself. Instead of the three inseparable terms

bound together in the living unity of an experience which a pure description

reveals, one finds oneself in the presence of three orders of events

which are external to each other: the events of nature, the organic events,

and those of thought, which will explain each other. Perception will result

from an action of the thing on the body and of the body on the soul. First

it is the sensible, the perceived itself, to which the functions of extramental

things are attributed; then the problem is to understand how a duplicate

or an imitation of the real is aroused in the body, then in thought.

If by “nature” one means a group of events bound by laws, perception

would be a part of nature, the perceived world a function of the

real world of primary qualities. Then the problem is to designate in the

body the adequate conditions of perception.

and the preferred forms of action and perception can be

treated even less as the summative effect of partial interactions. Thus the

properties of the phenomenal field are not expressible in a language

which would owe nothing to them.

a coisa percebida é a única que pode ser real

explanar

projetar

imagem mental

não é nem o olho nem o cérebro que vêm

mas um psiquismo...por isto MP chama de alma

The matter of knowledge becomes a limitnotion
posited by consciousness in its reflection upon itself, and not a
component of the act of knowing.

o julgar

dado e pensamento

corpo e alma

“The universe of immediate experience contains, not more than
what is required by science, but less; for it is a superficial and mutilated
world; it is, as Spinoza says, the world of conclusions without premises.” Kant, sei lá onde...

Put back into the intellectual context which alone gives it
a sense, “sensible consciousness” is eliminated as a problem. The body rejoins
the extension whose action it undergoes and of which it is only a
part; perception rejoins judgment, which subtends it. Every form of consciousness
presupposes its completed form: the dialectic of the epistemological
subject and the scientific object.

reality as an object of consciousness.???

It has seemed to us that
matter, life, and mind could not be defined as three orders of reality or
three sorts of beings, but as three planes of meaning or three forms of
unity.

In brief, the alleged reciprocal action is reducible
to an alternation or a substitution of dialectics. Since the physical, the vital,
and the mental individual are distinguished only as different degrees
of integration, to the extent that man is completely identified with the
third dialectic, that is, to the extent that he no longer allows systems of
isolated conduct to function in him, his soul and his body are no longer
distinguished.

This supposes that he knows it instead of obeys it. For
a being who lives at the simply biological level, it is a fatality. For a being
who has acquired the consciousness of self and his body, who has reached
the dialectic of subject and object, the body is no longer the cause of the
structure of consciousness; it has become the object of consciousness.

Reduced to the
status of object of consciousness, the body could not be conceived as an
intermediary between “things” and the consciousness which knows them;
and since consciousness, having left the obscurity of instinct, no longer expresses the vital properties of objects but their true properties, the parallelism
here is between consciousness and the true world which it knows
directly. All the problems seem to be eliminated: the relations of the soul
and the body—obscure as long as the body is treated in abstraction as a
fragment of matter—are clarified when one sees in the body the bearer of
a dialectic. Since the physical world and the organism can be conceptualized
only as objects of consciousness or as meanings, the problem of the
relations of consciousness and its physical or organic “conditions” would
exist only at the level of a confused thought which adheres to abstractions;
it would disappear in the domain of truth in which the relation of the epistemological
subject and its object alone subsists as original. This would
constitute the only legitimate theme of philosophical reflection.

Perceptual behavior, as science studies it, is
not defined in terms of nerve cells and synapses; it is not in the brain or
even in the body; science has not been able to construct the “central sectors”
of behavior from the outside like something which is enclosed within
a cranial box; it can understand it only as a dialectic, the moments of
which are not stimuli and movements but phenomenal objects and actions.

como explicar a surdez de Bethoven e seus últimos trabalhos?

estrutrua

contingente arranjamento das coisas ao nosso redor

que pedem sentido em nossa presença

inteligibilidade em estado nascente

não se sabe onde está o centro

da consciência

por vezes parece nem estar dentro...mas fora de nós...pois

o próprio corpo é objeto de nossa consciência...

The mind does not use the body, but realizes
itself through it while at the same time transferring the body outside
of the physical space.

nor define the soul as the “sense of the body,” the body
as the “manifestation of the soul.”

Our body does not always make sense, and our
thoughts, on the other hand—in timidity, for example—do not always
find in it the plentitude of their vital expression. In these cases of disintegration,
the soul and the body are apparently distinct; and this is the truth
of dualism.

There is always a duality which reappears on one level or another: hunger
or thirst prevents thought or feelings; the properly sexual dialectic ordinarily
reveals itself through a passion; integration is never absolute and
it always fails—at a higher level in the writer, at a lower level in the aphasic.
There always comes a moment when we divest ourselves of a passion
because of fatigue or self-respect.

This duality is not a simple fact; it is
founded in principle—all integration presupposing the normal functioning
of subordinated formations, which always demand their own due.
But it is not a duality of substances; or in other words, the notions of soul
and body must be relativized: there is the body as mass of chemical components in interaction, the body as dialectic of living being and its biological
milieu, and the body as dialectic of social subject and his group;
even all our habits are an impalpable body for the ego of each moment.Each of these degrees is soul with respect to the preceding one, body with
respect to the following one. The body in general is a set of paths already
traced, of powers already constituted; the body is the acquired dialectical
soil upon which a higher “formation” is accomplished, and the soul is the
sense which is then established

os significados estão encarnados nas cOISAS...
EU ACABEI O CAPÍTULO, SEM MAIS.... ERA SOBRE O PROBLEMA DE CORPO E ALMA, MAS NÃO VOU CITAR...É DA MP, É CLARO, E MEUS DEVANEIOS...É CLARO...