cachoeira cai do céu
bom...
The perceptual foundations of judgment become clearer when we
consider aspects or gestalts that shift even while the discrete parts of
objects remain fixed. As Merleau-Ponty says, “perception is not an
act of understanding. I have only to look at a landscape upside down
to recognize nothing in it” (PP 57/46/54).
a percepção não está fundamentada nas sensações
“there is a significance of the percept that has no equivalent in the universe
of the understanding, a perceptual milieu that is not yet the objective
world, a perceptual being that is not yet determinate being” (PP 58/46–7/54).
Intellectualism ignores the indeterminacy of perception
and helps itself uncritically to a view of the world as described
by the physical sciences: “the real flaw of intellectualism lies precisely
in its taking as given the determinate universe of science”
(PP 58/47/54). Only by bracketing that fully objective description of
the world, the description that aspires to a view from nowhere, as
it were, and stepping back from the theoretical achievements of scientific
theory to our ordinary situated perspective on our familiar
environment can we recover the abiding naivet´e that constitutes the
positive organizing principle of our conscious lives. For the world as
given in perception is not the world as described by science, nor even
the world as described in prescientific cognition: “Perception is not
a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of
a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is
presupposed by them” (PP v/x–xi/xi).
Perception understood as a background condition of intelligibility,
the intelligibility both of judgments and of the misbegotten concept
of sensation, is an inheritance we are already intimately familiar
with as children, long before we are in a position to comprehend the
world or ourselves from the depersonalized standpoint of science:
The child lives in a world he unhesitatingly believes to be accessible to
all around him; he has no consciousness of himself or of others as private
subjectivities, nor does he suspect that we are all, himself included, limited
to a certain point of view on the world. . . . Men are, for him, empty heads
turned toward a single self-evident world. (PP 407/355/413)
o mundo adulto intersubjetivo
o mundo préreflexivo que a criança acessa
um mundo primitivo primordial compartilhado
a criança sabe que está no mesmo mundo dos adultos
mas e a situação?
só depois....no mundo adulto
o body schema
formado ao longo da vida
o background
for if it is true that I am conscious of my body via the world, that it is the
unperceived term in the center of the world toward which all objects turn
their face, it is true for the same reason that my body is the pivot of the
world: I know that objects have several faces because I could walk around
them, and in that sense I am conscious of the world by means of my body.
(PP 97/82/94–5)
aderência
entrelaçamento
intencionalidade motora
sua normatividade
body schema....de novo
my body has a grip on the world when my perception offers me a spectacle as
varied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions,
as they unfold, receive from the world the responses they anticipate. This
maximum distinctness in perception and action defines a perceptual ground,
a basis of my life, a general milieu for the coexistence of my body and the
world. (PP 289–90/250/292
Our constant self-correcting bodily orientation in the environment
constitutes the perceptual background against which discrete sensory
particulars and explicit judgments can then emerge: “our body
is not the object of an ‘I think’: it is an ensemble of lived meanings
that moves to its equilibrium” (PP 179/153/177).
Just as the perceived world endures only through the reflections,
shadows, levels, and horizons between things . . .
so the works and thought of a philosopher are also made
of certain articulations between things said.
Merleau-Ponty
