carne
não é só toque
é condição de possibilidade do toque
toque
condição real que o corpo vive
a troca que faz ser possível
pode ser chamado, mas não encontrado
o que escapa quando tentamos segurá-lo?
“We are our soul, but we do not have the idea of it;
we only have feeling’s obscure contact with it”  (le contact obscur
du sentiment). (MP, S 181/143–4)

“I can only feel that which touches me”
(U 24/43). Malebranche
O eu é um que sente.. mesmo autor.
então MP pergunta:
em que condições um eu é capaz de informar o que sente?

não é o eu da auto-representação que é eu? Não!
esta não nos dá um relato do que o eu sente
o eu é o ser que sente, simplesmente, que toca e é tocado.

entrelaçamento
carne em MP
ativo e passivo são confundidos

consciência não é um termo a que o corpo corresponde
mas a forma que o corpo toma como ideal

cogito Malebranche
1. autoconhecimento = obscuro
2. conhecimento de ideias visíveis a mim mesmo, envolve como o meu corpo é ser encorporado
3. conhecimento de Deus, a luz do seu toque, a graça, sinestesia, inteligência

a experiência corporal não é primária
Deus não tem um corpo

MP aceita o primeiro, sobre o eu conhecer-se, eu não posso capturar a minh'alma

“I can construct a ‘pseudo-idea’ of the soul with the notion
of extension” (U 21/40). Malebranche

o que MP tá fazendo com essa teologia do final do XVII?


feminismo..? pera, ela vai começar...

a relação com o corpo de sujeito-objeto em Sartre, o modelo do toque
do corpo do outro, o olhar do outro
relação insustentável
MP reconcilia-os com a relação de troca
do tocar e ser tocado
do chiasma... rs

eu não posso ver sem ser visto
amar sem primeiro ser amado... ah lindo!
amar a Deus, sentir o amor o amor de Deus para amar as coisas...isto ainda Malebranche...

ok MP volta ao toque nos escritos finais..
ontologia do toque
chiasm
entrelaçamento
a emergência do eu com base no quiasma
carne

the flesh is an ultimate notion . . . it is not the union or compound of two
substances, but thinkable by itself, if there is a relation of the visible with
itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I do
not form, which forms me, this coiling over (enroulement) of the visible
upon the visible, can traverse, animate other bodies as well as my own. (VI
185/140)

  Later,

the flesh we are speaking of is not matter. It is the coiling over of the visible
upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested
in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching
the things, such that, simultaneously, as tangible it descends among
them. (VI 191–2/146)

So touched and
touching are not reciprocal relations; they do notmirror one another;
they do not forma circle or a relation of reciprocity. I amnot touched
as I touch, and this noncoincidence is essential to me and to touch,
but what does it mean? It means that I cannot always separate the
being touched from the touching, but neither can they be collapsed
into one another. There is no mirror image, and no reflexivity, but
a coiling and folding, suggesting that there are moments of contact,
of nonconceptualizable proximity, but that this proximity is not an
identity, and it knows no closure. At another moment, he calls the
flesh “a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself.” This
same sentence that I was reading continues. It is a long sentence, and
it coils back on itself, refusing to end, touching its own grammatical
moments, refusing to let any of them pose as final. Merleau-Ponty
thus attempts to end his sentence this way: “as touching [the body]
dominates themall and draws this relationship and even this double
relationship from itself, by dehiscence or fission of its own mass.”
The flesh is not my flesh or yours, but neither is it some third thing.
It is the name for a relation of proximity and of breaking up. (Judith Butler)


carne uma textura que retorna a si mesma e está de acordo com si mesmo.
tocar e ser tocado não é o mesmo...não entendi muito bem a explicação dela.....
tocar e ser tocado: chiasma e apreensão do mundo
chiasma e obscuridade da alma, que é apreendida por meio de ideias????????

o problema da alteridade
nenhuma unidade resolve a tensão desta relação interna
cisão
ir do eu para si, do si para alteridade
o conhecimento obscuro da alma
não somente vivida como passividade
mas como um sentimento de si mesmo
não há fiscalização de mim mesmo que fornece um acesso claro à inteligibilidade

“for there to be light, there must be, facing me, a representative
being . . . otherwise, my soul will be dispersed and at the mercy of its
states” (U 31/50). Merleau-POnty

So a subject who has only its own feeling to rely
on, whose feeling is given no face, encountered by a representative of
“being,” is one that suffers its own dispersion, living at the mercy of
its own random feeling. What holds those states and feelings together
is not a unity to be found at the level of the subject, but one only
conferred by the object, in its ideality. It is the one addressed by such
feeling who confers intelligibility on one’s own desire. This other,
the one to whom feeling is addressed, the one who solicits feeling,
does so precisely to the extent that the Other represents being. For
that Other to represent being is not for it to be being itself, but to be
its sign, its relay, its occasion, its deflection. (Judith Butler)

a senciência é referencial
vários seres: perspectivas de um ideal

. It is the ideal kernel according to which
real extension [substance] is offered to knowledge” (U 31/50). (MP)

 Thus,
what one feels, if it is a feeling, if it is a sense, if it is love, or even if it
is a touch, for instance, is sustained by the ideality of its addressee,
of the uncapturability of the referent, the irreducibility of the ideal
to any of its perspectival adumbrations. (Judith Butler)

o verbo divino ininteligível (um pensamento incompreensível do infinito)
que torna o corpo enigmático
por poder produzir neste o inteligível
este infinito enigmático refere-se a corpos e como estes estão incluídos
no reino inteligível, mas há o que não pode ser narrado ou compreendido
idealidade inesgotável

 Merleau-Ponty writes, “the unconscious
. . . is nothing but a call to intelligence, to which intelligence
does not respond, because intelligence is of another order. There is
nothing to explain outside of intelligence, and there is nothing to
explain here, but only something that asserts itself, simply” (U 116).

Here Merleau-Ponty makes clear the sense of the “unconscious” that
he accepts, and it has to do with the way in which the unknown,
and the unknowable, pervades the horizon of consciousness. In this
sense, he is concerned, as was Malebranche, with how an order of
intelligibility that is not fully recoverable by consciousness makes
itself known, partially and enigmatically, at the level of corporeity
and affect. In his view, it would be a mistake to claim, for instance,
that when I fall in love, and am conscious of every phase of feeling
I go through, I therefore understand something of the form and
significance that each of these lucid images has for me, how they
work together, what enigma of intelligibility they offer up. It is necessary,
he writes, to distinguish between being in love and knowing
that one is in love. “The fact that I am in love is a reason not to
know that I am, because I dispose myself to live that love instead
of placing it before my eyes” (U 117). Even if I attempt to see it,
Merleau-Ponty insists, “My eyes, my vision, which appears to me as
prepersonal . . .my field of vision is limited, but in a manner that is
imprecise and variable . . .my vision is not an operation of which I
am the master” (U 118). Something sees through me as I see. I see
with a seeing that is not mine alone. I see, and as I see, the I that I
am is put at risk, discovers its derivation from what is permanently
enigmatic to itself. (Judith)

ressoa claramente com a noção de Malebranche que a autocompreensão
é fundamentada numa obscuridade necessária

What follows is that we should
not think that we will be able to grasp ourselves or, indeed, any object
of knowledge, without a certain failure of understanding, one
which makes the grasping hand, the figure for so much philosophical
apprehension, a derivative deformation of originary touch. (Judith)

Ela não voltou a falar do feminismo...loucura...não entendi..
terminou com a importância da troca, da alteridade,
do toque para todo ser humano.

This does not
mean that we are all touched well, or that we know how to touch in
return, but only that our very capacity to feel and our emergence as
knowing and acting beings is at stake in the exchange. (Butler)