o corpo silencioso
o corpo antes do cogito
o corpo tácito

Nietzsche : a mente que é instrumento do corpo
ainda parece reforçar o dualismo....
particularmente quando lembramos da sua impotência corporal...
por que não trata de descrever as experiências corporais?
por que primeiro é focar no corpo como fundamento de sua filosofia

Moreover, the apparent limitation that bodily perceptions
are vague, corrigible, or ambiguous is reinterpreted as usefully true
to a world of experience that is itself ambiguous, vague, and in flux.(Richard Shusterman)

a carne, como em São Paulo e Santo Agostinho
um corpo pré-reflexivo
prépredicativo
e este contato robusto com as coisas, o que isto?
ao nosso mundo vivido,
“to return to
that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always
speaks” (PP iii/ix/x).


Phenomenology is therefore “a philosophy for
which the world is always ‘already there’ before reflection begins –
as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon
reachieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing
that contact with a philosophical status” (PP i/vii/vii).
Philosophy is perforce a reflective act, but phenomenology’s “radical
reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on
an unreflective life which is its initial situation, unchanging, given
once and for all” (PP ix/xiv/xvi). “It tries to give a direct description
of our experience as it is” in our basic prereflective state (PP i/vii/vii),
pursuing “the ambition to make reflection emulate the unreflective
life of consciousness” (PP xi/xvi/xvii). Such philosophy “is not the
reflection of a preexisting truth” (PP xv/xx/xxiii), but rather an effort
“of describing our perception of the world as that upon which our
idea of truth is forever based” (PP xi/xvi/xviii); it aims at “relearning
to look at the world” with this direct, prereflective perception
and to act in it accordingly (PP xvi/xx/xxiii). Such primary perception
and prereflective consciousness are embodied in an operative
intentionality that is characterized by immediacy and spontaneity
(S 111–16/89–94). “Thus the proper function of a phenomenological
philosophy” would be “to establish itself definitively in the order
of instructive spontaneity” (S 121/97); and this basic, embodied “order
of instructive spontaneity” constitutes a worldly wisdom and
competence that all people share. Merleau-Ponty therefore concludes
that the special knowledge of the philosopher
is only a way of putting into words what every man knows well. . . . These
mysteries are in each of us as in him. What does he say of the relation
between the soul and the body, except what is known by all men who make
their souls and bodies, their good and their evil, go together in one piece?
(EP 63/63)
(Richard Shusterman, sobre Merleau-POnty

consciência silenciosa
subjetividade primária
expressão primordial
espontaneidade
filosofia concentrada no que é universal, básico e permanente
estudo da percepção