A Phenomenology of Life

Renaud Barbaras


ich..já começou com citação de Derrida, vou tomar um café...
sobre fenomenologia transcendental e psicológica...pootz...

But the strange unity of these two parallels, that which refers the one to the
other, does not allow itself to be sundered (partager) by them and, by dividing
itself, finally joins the transcendental to its other; this unity is life. One
finds quickly enough that the sole nucleus of the concept of psuchˆe is life as
self-relationship, whether or not it takes place in the formof consciousness.
“Living” is thus the name of that which precedes the reduction and finally
escapes all the divisions which the latter gives rise to. (Derrida)

três páginas e eu não sei do que ele está falando...
algo como a importância da redução fenomenológica, imagino
ok, fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty é a fenomenologia da vida
e completa a de Husserl

I would like to show, then, that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
is really a phenomenology of life, which means Merleau-Ponty’s
thought completes the project of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed,
we can say that Merleau-Ponty’s main purpose, from beginning to
end, is to give sense to the Husserlian lifeworld as it is described
in the Crisis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s purpose is to develop a phenomenology
that takes into account the irreducibility of the lifeworld.
In a note in Phenomenology of Perception, he writes,

Husserl in his last period concedes that all reflection should in the first place
return to the description of the lifeworld (monde v´ecu) (Lebenswelt). But he
adds that, by means of a second “reduction,” the structures of the lifeworld
must be reinstated in the transcendental flow of a universal constitution in
which all the world’s obscurities are elucidated. It is clear, however, that we
are faced with a dilemma: either the constitution makes the world transparent,
in which case it is not obvious why reflection needs to pass through the
lifeworld, or else it retains something of that world and never rids it of its
opacity. (PP 419n/365n/425n)

Merleau-POnty reconhece a especificidade do mundo da vida (Lebenswelt) confronta
o papel da subjetividade transcendental
não se interessa por um mundo de teses (Weltthesis)
um mundo representado...mas o próprio mundo na transparência de sua
constituição

atitude natural X atitude transcendental

The truth is that the relationships between the natural and the transcendental
attitudes are not simple, are not side by side or sequential, like the false
or the apparent and the true. There is a preparation for phenomenology in
the natural attitude. It is the natural attitude which, by reiterating its own
procedures, seesaws (bascule) in phenomenology. It is the natural attitude
itself which goes beyond itself in phenomenology – and so it does not go
beyond itself. (MP, S207/164)

The subject of the lifeworld is precisely life. (Barbaras) adorei!

Leben verbo intransitivo no alemão, no francês tbm
ambígua
viver : estar vivo
experienciando

Comenta um pouco o capítulo sobre sexualidade que está na Fenomenologia da Percepção,
eu gostei muito deste capítulo também, inclusive por falar de Freud...
a sexualidade é tão importante, é corpo,  mas colocá-la acima de todos os fenômenos..???
lembro de apontar a teoria de Freud como uma tautologia...não sei explicar...

ok, voltando ao Barbaras... cito..

Here Merleau-Ponty recognizes that if corporeal life transcends itself
in an existential significance that goes beyond natural needs, it is also true that this significance, whatever it may be, is rooted in
corporeal life. In other words, it is life itself that transcends its natural
or biological dimension and involves the whole realm of meaning:
thus, just as we need a sexual body to develop meaningful relationships
with others, so, too, we must be alive and have sense organs to
experience anything and, finally, to perceive a world.

Depois disso começar a afirmar que a fenomenologia de Merleau-POnty
é fenomenologia da vida...

At the beginning of The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty defines
his subject in the following way: “Our goal is to understand
the relations of consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or
even social. By nature we understand here a multiplicity of events
external to each other and bound together by relations of causality”
(MP, SC 1/3).

Diz que MP propõe um novo significado para o ser..
que não é consciência pura
nem um mero objeto
diz de comportamento

“because, taken in itself, it is neutral with respect
to the classical distinctions between the ‘mental’ and the ‘physiological’
and thus can give us the opportunity of defining them anew”
(MP, SC 2/4).

By taking the concept of behavior as his starting point,
Merleau-Ponty makes possible an investigation concerning life because
behavior is a more neutral and comprehensive notion referring
to what all living beings have in common. (Barbaras)

ao adotar o conceito de comportamento  MP não está livre do  dualismo
realismo e idealismo
há behavioristas que reduzem o comportamento a relações causais
e outros que acreditam ter como fonte a consciência....

o que importa é a metodologia de MP
a descrição do comportamento
a abordagem fenomenológica!!

comportamento não pode ser  reduzido a uma ação mecânica
há intencionalidade
e não depende de uma consciência


vitalismo é uma expressão de impotência
projetamos nos outros organismos nossa percepção
um organismo não é a soma de suas partes
são fenômenos

The problem is this: the phenomenon is not an appearance, but
rather what is given by being itself. Being exists only as phenomenon,
which is to say, phenomenality is reality. On the other hand, the appearing,
the relation of manifestation, clearly entails a distinction
between what is manifest and the manifestation itself. Even if phenomenality
is autonomous, in the sense that it does not depend on
another reality, it cannot be, qua phenomenality, a new reality. It is
the manifestation of something, a “coming to light,” and this entails
a distinction. (Barbaras)

a realidade não é alcançada através de uma abordagem analítica
então a totalidade será de uma só vez fenomenal ereal.

Moreover, thanks to this rigorous analysis of life, Merleau-Ponty
discovers a new meaning of being, situated beyond the distinction
between the in-itself and the for-itself, thus overcoming the opposition
between consciousness and object, which Merleau-Ponty knows he must abandon. (Barbaras)

carne para cadeira
a realidade é outra coisa que sua aparência
existe em si mesma e não depende da consciência
a realidade é fenomenal não porque se refere à consciência
ele se refere à consciência
porque é em si mesmo fenomenal: a consciência é uma dimensão
ou como conseqüência da fenomenalidade, não uma condição para si
"a carne do mundo é do-ser visto, ou seja, é um Serque é eminentemente percipi, e é por isso que podemos entender opercipere "(VI 304/250)

O fenômeno - ou seja, a carne - égrávida de todas as percepções possíveis

ser e não ser
ausência e presença
visível e invisível
aparência e transcendência

The sensible is precisely that medium in which there can be being without
it having to be posited; the sensible appearance of the sensible, the silent
persuasion of the sensible is Being’s unique way of manifesting itself without
becoming positivity, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent. (MP< VI
267/214)    

o todo não é nada mais que suas partes..
a distinção entre essência e existência é uma abstração
o tecido da realidade revela uma comunicação transversal

 As Merleau-Ponty writes, “In a sense, there
is only the multiple, and this totality that surges from it is not a
totality in potential, but the establishment of a certain dimension”
(N 208/156). We know that the aim of the chapter in The Visible
and the Invisible titled “Interrogation and Intuition” is precisely to
surmount this opposition and to disclose a deeper aspect, which he
calls “wild essence,” “dimension,” and “hinge.” I believe, then, that
this notion of dimension, understood as a system of equivalences,
which is Merleau-Ponty’s concept of being, also derives from his
analysis of life. Vital processes reveal a unity of style par excellence,
that is, a kinship that is not based on any positive principle, such as
an essence. Rather, vital processes reveal a communication among
events beyond the spatiotemporal framework. The central concept of
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology derives from the phenomenology of life. (Barbaras)